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Abstract
In a series of papers Colbeck and Renner (2011, 2015) claim to have shown that the quantum state
provides a complete description for the prediction of future measurement outcomes. In this paper I argue
that thus far no solid satisfactory proof has been presented to support this claim. Building on the earlier
work of Leifer (2014), Landsman (2015) and Leegwater (2016), I present and prove two results that only
partially support this claim. I then discuss the arguments by Colbeck, Renner and Leegwater concerning
how these results are to generalize to the full claim. This argument turns out to hinge on the implicit use
of an assumption concerning the way unitary evolution is to be represented in any possible completion of
quantum mechanics. I argue that this assumption is unsatisfactory and that possible attempts to validate
it based on measurement theory also do not succeed.
1 Introduction
Can quantum-mechanical description of physical reality be considered complete? In the famous paper with this
title, Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (1935) argued that the question should be answered in the negative. It
was one of several arguments that Einstein devised and although it was presumably among his least favorites
(Fine, 2017), it is still the most widely known.
Around the same time, Neumann (1927, 1932) presented a formal argument towards the opposite conclusion.
Apart from starting from different assumptions1, the adopted notions of completeness are also quite distinct
(Elby, Brown, and Foster, 1993). While Einstein was concerned with whether the quantum mechanical de-
scription sufficed to give a physical explanation of the phenomena predicted, von Neumann adopted a more
operational approach concerning the question whether the addition of hidden variables could allow for deviat-
ing predictions for the phenomena. More precisely, the following question was considered. If we consider an
ensemble of systems E described by a pure quantum state ψ, is it possible to decompose this ensemble into
sub-ensembles E1, E2, . . . such that the predictions for the sub-ensembles are not equal to the predictions for
the total ensemble? If not, then quantum mechanics may be considered complete.2
Colbeck and Renner’s completeness claim (Colbeck and Renner, 2011, 2015) alludes to von Neumann’s
notion of completeness. In their own words, they show that “[u]nder the assumption that measurements can
be chosen freely [...] no extension of quantum theory can give more information about the outcomes of future
measurements than quantum theory itself” (Colbeck and Renner, 2011, p. 1). In a follow-up paper Colbeck
and Renner (2012) extended their proof to obtain a ψ-ontology theorem.3 Making use of the same “free choice”
assumption, they conclude that “a system’s wave function is in one-to-one correspondence with its elements of
reality.”
The assumption of “free choice” has since been identified as the conjunction of two more familiar assumptions:
parameter independence and setting independence4 (Ghirardi and Romano, 2013; Vona and Liang, 2014).
Despite this clarification, there has been confusion about whether these two assumptions suffice, or if more
assumptions that rely on the specific mathematical structure of quantum mechanics are needed. Since then,
Leifer (2014), relying on (Colbeck and Renner, 2017), presented a rigorous proof for the second claim by
Colbeck and Renner that does not rely on the validity of the completeness claim. Landsman (2015) gave a
1See (Bub, 2010; Dieks, 2017) for comprehensive accounts of von Neumann’s proof.
2Actually, von Neumann was specifically considering the possibility of dispersion-free sub-ensembles.
3The most famous ψ-ontology theorem is the PBR theorem (Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph, 2012). See (Leifer, 2014) for an
overview of ψ-ontology theorems.
4This second assumption states that the settings for a measurement are independent of the state of the system to be measured.
It also appears in the literature as measurement independence, λ-independence, no conspiracy, free will, and presumably under
several other names.
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critical assessment of the completeness claim, arguing that on top of these explicit assumptions, the proof for ψ-
completeness relies on no less than four further rather technical assumptions. A far more friendly conclusion was
reached by Leegwater (2016) who gave a thorough reworking of Colbeck and Renner’s original proof. However,
Landsman’s worries were not explicitly addressed by Leegwater, and the proof is not transparent enough to
easily assess whether Landsman’s criticism was indeed moot.
In this paper I argue that the general conclusion drawn by Colbeck and Renner is currently unwarranted.
To this end a formal statement of their two claims in terms of the ontic models framework is given in section 3
after motivating the use of this framework in section 2. In section 3 it is also shown that the completeness claim
is logically stronger than the ψ-ontology claim, thus showing that the issues of Landsman (2015) are not simply
resolved by reworking the proof of Leifer (2014). The general strategy for proving the completeness claim is to
start with proving it for the special case of two systems in a maximally entangled state. This case is discussed
in section 4 as well as its generalization to arbitrary entangled states. In section 5 I discuss how this result is
supposed to generalize to the case of individual systems. The crucial step needed to make that generalization is
then scrutinized and criticized in section 6 and I conclude that no satisfactory proof of the completeness claim
is currently available.
2 The use of ontic models
Ontic models are a useful tool for studying non-classical features of quantum mechanics.5 An ontic model for a
system introduces a set Λ of possible ontic states for the system. These ontic states determine how the system is
to respond in the case of a measurement, in the sense that with each possible measurement procedure the state
λ ∈ Λ associates a probability distribution over possible measurement outcomes. These probability distributions
may be thought of as representing, possibly dispositional, properties of the system. Possible preparations of the
system are associated with probability distributions over the state space (thus Λ is assumed to be a measurable
space). These may be thought of as representing ignorance concerning the “true” state of the system λ.
2.1 Motivating their use
The use of ontic models is not trivially innocuous. A possible reason for disliking ontic models, is that they
seem to come equipped with metaphysical baggage. It is common, as suggested by their name, to interpret
ontic states as representing the physical properties of the system and with a slight abuse of language these
states may be called “real”.6 Colbeck and Renner indeed seem hesitant to embrace this kind of terminology as
indicated for example by their short discussion of the PBR theorem (Colbeck and Renner, 2015, p. 68). But
no such interpretation is forced upon us. If one wants, one can simply think of ontic states as mathematical
objects competing with quantum states for being “the best” description of the system. The interpretation of
ontic states for an ontic model is then as much open to debate as the interpretation of quantum states.
Another possible reason for not wanting to use ontic models is that they may not be general enough.
Indeed, setting independence is an implicit assumption of this framework since probability distributions over
ontic states are taken to not depend on which measurements are or are not performed on the system. This is
in fact a common loophole in no-go theorems that may be exploited in, for example, retrocausal approaches
(Friederich and Evans, 2019). Although there are ways to generalize the framework to try to accommodate
for this loophole7, there is no need to go into this issue since setting independence is accepted as part of the
assumptions in Colbeck and Renner’s claims.
With respect to the issue of setting dependence, the framework used by Colbeck and Renner is indeed more
general. The framework they use is more akin to the use of causal networks such as in the work of Wood and
Spekkens (2015).8 In this approach, measurement settings, measurement outcomes, quantum states and hidden
variable states are all treated on a par as random variables on some big probability space. So correlations
between states and settings are indeed allowed.
However, the network approach is not general enough for the purposes of Colbeck and Renner’s proof. What
is needed is that probabilities for outcomes conditional on settings and states are always well-defined. Within
the network approach this meams that probabilities for settings and states are always well-defined and non-zero,
so they can be conditionalized upon. When considering a finite fragment of quantum mechanics (finite number
5The framework was first introduced in (Spekkens, 2005). See also (Harrigan, Rudolph, and Aaronson, 2007).
6See (Halvorson, 2019) for further discussion.
7See for example (Hermens, 2019).
8It deserves to be noted though that the approach of Colbeck and Renner is rather unorthodox. The nodes in their networks are,
what they call, “spacetime random variables” and their causal arrows have a meaning that is quite distinct from the one adopted
in the theory of causal networks.
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of states and settings), such as in Bell’s theorem, such probabilities can always be defined. But Colbeck and
Renner don’t stick to the finite setting in their proof and it is doubtful whether the claims of Colbeck and
Renner (possibly modified) could be proven in such a finite setting.9
Within an ontic model, the probability of an outcome conditional on a setting is well-defined and is taken
to be primitive. A price to pay is that settings and outcomes are not treated on a par and probabilities for
settings are not defined. One could insist that, fundamentally, there should be no distinction between the two.
But this is not a complaint against ontic models specifically, but should be considered on a more general level.
As Seevinck and Uffink (2011, p. 438) note:
Even quantum mechanics leaves the question what measurement is going to be performed on a
system as one that is decided outside the theory, and does not specify how much more probable one
measurement is than another. It thus seems reasonable not to require from the candidate theories
that they describe such probabilities.
In this light we see that the complaint against ontic models is actually not that they are not general enough
because they allow a distinction between settings and outcomes but, actually, they are too lenient for having a
distinction that allows for ambiguity concerning the true ontology. But that could hardly be a complaint for
using the framework to prove theorems in the foundations of quantum mechanics.
For the reader not persuaded by any of these considerations, there is one final motivation for the use of ontic
models. I currently have no other viable framework within which I can formulate a rigorous partial proof for the
claims by Colbeck and Renner. It is simply a requirement that the conditional probabilities are well-defined,
and ontic models simply seem to provide a minimal mathematical structure needed to establish this. In this
regard, it also deserves to be mentioned that “ontic model” is not much more than a label for a standardized
mathematical structure that has been (sometimes implicitly) used to analyze results like Bell’s theorem for
decades.
2.2 Formalism
The prime constraint for ontic models, is that they can reproduce the quantum mechanical predictions for
measurements on any quantum system. Here, with a quantum system we associate a finite-dimensional Hilbert
space H together with a triple of sets (P ,M, T ) denoting sets of preparations, measurements and transforma-
tions respectively. It is assumed that every preparation P ∈ P can be represented by a density operator ρ, every
measurement M ∈ M can be represented by a self-adjoint operator A (i.e., only PVMs are considered), and
every transformation T ∈ T can be represented by a unitary operator U . If ρ is pure, it will often be represented
by a unit vector ψ that satisfies ρ = [ψ], where [ψ] is the 1-dimensional projection on the line spanned by ψ.
Taking into account the work of Spekkens (2005), the triple (P ,M, T ) is expected to be contextual, i.e, the
mappings M 7→ A, P 7→ ρ, T 7→ U will in general be many-to-one. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed
that the mappings are also onto. Thus every quantum state can be prepared, every self-adjoint operator can
be measured, and every unitary operation can be brought about by means of a transformation.10 The proba-
bilities for measurement outcomes are given by the Born rule. That is, when P, T,M are represented by ρ, U,A
respectively, then
P(a|M,T, P ) = Tr (UρU∗[a]A) , (1)
where [a]A is the projection onto the eigenspace of A corresponding to the eigenvalue a.
An ontic model for a quantum system consists of a measurable space of ontic states (Λ,Σ), where Λ is
the set of ontic states and Σ is a σ-algebra of subsets of Λ. Every measurement M ∈ M, is associated with
a Markov kernel pM , called a response function, that associates with every λ ∈ Λ a probability distribution
pM ( . |λ) over the possible measurement outcomes. Following Leegwater (2016), these probabilities will be called
λ-probabilities. Every preparation P ∈ P is associated with a probability measure µP over the ontic states and
every transformation T ∈ T is associated with a Markov kernel γT from Λ to itself. On average, the predictions
9This can be seen from the fact that in the EPRB setting with two possible settings for both Alice and Bob any maximally
entangled state can be written as a convex combinations of PR boxes. Thus within that finite setting the completeness claim does
not hold.
10If one is interested in the possibility of experimental tests, a focus on theorems that can be formulated for finite triples is
preferable (as for example in Bell’s theorem), since the validity of quantum mechanics can only be investigated for at most a finite
number of predictions. In this paper the issue is rather the validity of a particular claim. So it makes sense to work with one of
the weakest formulations of the claim relying on the validity of quite a lot of quantum mechanics.
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of quantum mechanics are required to be reproduced:
P(a|M,P ) =
∫
pM (a|λ)dµP (λ),
P(a|M,T, P ) =
∫∫
pM (a|λ)γT (dλ|λ˜)dµP (λ˜).
(2)
Often, when there is no cause for confusion, the use of P, T,M will be replaced by their quantum mechanical
representatives, resulting in more transparent equations like∫∫
pA(a|λ)γU (dλ|λ˜)dµψ(λ˜) = 〈Uψ|[a]A|Uψ〉 . (3)
In other cases, the quantum representatives will be added as subscripts. So MA denotes a measurement proce-
dure represented by the self-adjoint operator A in quantum mechanics.
It is worth noting that transformations can be reconsidered to be part of either the preparation procedure
or the measurement procedure. Specifically, for any MA, TU there is a response function pMA◦TU defined by
pMA◦TU (a|λ) :=
∫
pMA(a|λ˜)γTU (dλ˜|λ), (4)
which corresponds to an operational procedure for a measurement that is represented quantum mechanically
by the operator U∗AU . Likewise, for any TU , Pρ there is a probability distribution µTU◦Pρ defined by
µTU◦Pρ(∆) :=
∫
γTU (∆|λ)dµPρ (λ), ∆ ∈ ΣH, (5)
which corresponds to an operational procedure for a preparation of the state represented by UρU∗. Finally, any
two transformations γT1 , γT2 may be stringed together to give the transformation “T2 after T1” given by
γT2◦T1(∆|λ) :=
∫
γT2(∆|λ˜)γT1(dλ˜|λ). (6)
3 ψ-completeness and ψ-ontology
A straightforward ontic model for quantum mechanics is the one by Beltrametti and Bugajski (1995), which
is basically quantum mechanics itself. The set of ontic states Λ is taken to be the set of one-dimensional
projections. The λ-probabilities for a measurement MA are given by the Born rule, i.e., for each [ψ] ∈ Λ
pMA(a|[ψ]) = 〈ψ|[a]A|ψ〉 . (7)
A preparation Pψ of a pure state corresponds to the Dirac-distribution centered on [ψ], while a preparation of a
mixed state corresponds to an appropriate convex combination of such Dirac-distributions. So in general there
are multiple distinct distributions µρ corresponding to the same ρ. The quantum dynamics are just copied, i.e,
γU (∆|[ψ]) =
{
1 [Uψ] ∈ ∆,
0 otherwise.
(8)
This model may rightfully be said to be trivial. In particular because it has the property that the λ-
probabilities coincide with the quantum probabilities. This is the key idea to the formal notion of triviality and
ψ-completeness.
Definition 1. An ontic model for a quantum system is said to be trivial with respect to a set of measurements
M′ ⊂ M and preparations P ′ ⊂ P if for every preparation Pρ ∈ P ′ and every measurement MA ∈ M′ the
λ-probabilities µPρ -almost surely coincide with the quantum mechanical probabilities:∫
|pMA(a|λ)− Tr (ρ[a]A)| dµPρ(λ) = 0 (9)
or, equivalently,
µPρ ({λ ∈ Λ | pMA(a|λ) = Tr (ρ[a]A)}) = 1. (10)
If the ontic model is trivial with respect to all measurements and preparations, then it is called ψ-complete.
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Colbeck and Renner’s completeness claim may now be formulated as follows:
Claim 1. For any quantum system every ontic model that satisfies parameter independence is ψ-complete.
It is worth pointing out that the notion of ψ-completeness was already introduced by Harrigan and Spekkens
(2010) with a different, but formally related, meaning. They call an ontic model ψ-complete if the set of
ontic states is isomorphic to the set of ontic states of the Beltrametti-Bugajski model and preparations of pure
quantum states correspond to the appropriate Dirac distributions. It follows that if an ontic model is ψ-complete
in the sense of Harrigan and Spekkens, it is automatically ψ-complete in the sense of Definition 1.
In the same paper, Harrigan and Spekkens introduced the distinction between ψ-ontic and ψ-epistemic ontic
models. Roughly, the idea is that whenever two preparations corresponding to two distinct pure quantum
states, then in a ψ-ontic model these preparations will yield distinct ontic states for the system. The following
definition is the now standard way to make this idea precise.
Definition 2. An ontic model for a quantum system is said to be ψ-ontic if for any pair of preparations P1, P2
represented by distinct pure quantum states the variational distance between their corresponding probability
measures µP1 , µP2 is one, i.e.,
sup
∆∈ΣH
|µP1(∆) − µP2(∆)| = 1. (11)
Colbeck and Renner’s ψ-ontology claim may now be formulated as follows:
Claim 2. For any quantum system every ontic model that satisfies parameter independence is ψ-ontic.
This claim and Claim 1 above are intended to be paraphrases of Claim 1 and Claim 2 in (Colbeck and
Renner, 2015) adapted to the framework of ontic models. But it deserves to be noted that instead of looking at
models for specific systems, Colbeck and Renner are looking at an “alternative theory that is compatible with
quantum theory”. In the next section it will become clear that this is not a moot point since their argument
relies on relating several quantum systems, which will then yield a slight modification of the two claims.
In the papers (Colbeck and Renner, 2012, 2015), Colbeck and Renner proved Claim 2 as part of a corollary of
a proof for Claim 1. An independent proof for Claim 2 was given in (Colbeck and Renner, 2017) which was also
referred to in (Colbeck and Renner, 2015) and served as the main inspiration for Leifer’s formulation and proof
of the Colbeck-Renner ψ-ontology theorem in (Leifer, 2014). It may be noted that actually Leifer showed not
that models should be ψ-ontic, but that the overlap between two quantum states tends to zero as the dimension
of the system goes to infinity. Thus Claim 2 only holds in the limit and we will see that something similar is
needed when considering Claim 1.
The following proposition establishes the relation between the two claims more directly.
Proposition 1. Any ontic model for a quantum system that is ψ-complete is also ψ-ontic.
Proof. Suppose a quantum system is given together with a ψ-complete ontic model. Let P1, P2 be any two
preparations corresponding to distinct pure quantum states ψ1, ψ2. Then there exists a measurement M ∈ M
corresponding to a self-adjoint operator A with eigenvalue a such that
〈ψ1|[a]A|ψ1〉 6= 〈ψ2|[a]A|ψ2〉 . (12)
Because the model is ψ-complete it follows that
µP1 ({λ ∈ ΛH | pM (a|λ) = 〈ψ1|[a]A|ψ1〉}) = 1, (13)
while
µP2 ({λ ∈ ΛH | pM (a|λ) = 〈ψ1|[a]A|ψ1〉}) = 0 (14)
so (11) holds.
The converse statement of this proposition is not true. One can think of Bohmian mechanics as an example
of a ψ-ontic theory that is not ψ-complete. Thus there is little hope for finding an easy proof for Claim 1 based
on Claim 2. My focus is therefore on Claim 1 alone, which Landsman (2015) has criticized but which was
endorsed by Leegwater (2016) after he clarified some of the technicalities behind the proof. I shall argue that a
rigorous proof for Claim 1 is currently lacking. But before that, I shall discuss and prove some weaker versions
of Claim 1 as a partial endorsement of Leegwater’s conclusion.
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4 Partial proofs for the completeness claim
4.1 The equiprobability theorem
The simplest partial proof for Claim 1 concerns local measurements on a pair of d-level quantum systems in a
maximally entangled state. The question is then of course how to generalize this to arbitrary states, arbitrary
measurements and arbitrary systems. But first an unambiguous formulation and proof of the partial claim is
required.
The scenario is the familiar EPR setup with associated Hilbert space H = Cd ⊗ Cd, and a preparation of
the system in the state
ψd :=
d∑
i=1
1√
d
ei ⊗ ei, (15)
where (ei)
d
i=1 is an arbitrary orthonormal basis for C
d. One of the subsystems is then sent to Alice, and the
other to Bob, who are assumed to be space-like separated.
Now let MA ⊂ M denote the set of possible measurements where only Alice performs a measurement
(locally). These can be represented by self-adjoint operators of the form A ⊗ 1. Symmetrically, let MB be
the set of possible measurements where only Bob performs a measurement, which can thus be represented by
operators of the form 1 ⊗ B. Finally, take MLOC to be the set of measurements where either Alice or Bob
performs a measurement or both. So one may takeMLOC ≃MA ×MB. Parameter independence can now be
formulated as
pMA⊗1(a|λ) =
∑
b
pMA⊗B (a, b|λ),
pM1⊗B (b|λ) =
∑
a
pMA⊗B (a, b|λ),
(16)
for all MA⊗1 ∈ MA,M1⊗B ∈ MB,MA⊗B ∈ MLOC. Here the local operational procedures MA⊗1 and M1⊗B
should be the same as those represented by MA⊗B. One then has the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Equiprobability theorem). Any ontic model for the pair of d-level systems that satisfies parameter
independence must be trivial w.r.t. MLOC and all preparations that are represented by ψd.
The basic structure of the proof for this theorem is due to Colbeck and Renner (2011).11 A proof that is
more adapted to the formulation used here can be found in the proofs of Theorems 10.4 and 10.7 in (Leifer,
2014). For completeness a proof is given in Appendix A, which will also serve as a stepping stone for the proof
of a generalized version of the theorem below.
Although the equiprobability theorem is still far removed from Claim 1, it deserves to be noted that the
result is an improvement on earlier work. Stairs (1983) showed that for any pair in a maximally entangled
d-level systems with d ≥ 3, there is no value definite ontic model that satisfies parameter independence.12 In
the present formulation, value definiteness can be understood as the assumption that the λ-probabilities are
0,1-valued. The work by Colbeck and Renner improves on this result on two accounts: the result also holds for
the case d = 2 and, not only must ontic models be probabilistic, they must even follow the quantum probability
rule.
Like the proof of Stairs’ theorem, the proof of the equiprobability theorem relies heavily on the special
properties of maximally entangled states. Because of the symmetry in the maximally entangled state, it assigns
equal probabilities to all outcomes for a non-disperse observable. This implies that it suffices to show that all
λ-probabilities should be equal. Thus no direct relation to the Born rule needs to be established. The proof
that all the λ-probabilities are equal in turn relies heavily on the perfect correlations of the maximally entangled
state.
The extension of the equiprobability theorem still relies on perfect correlations, but relaxes the symmetry
property. Specifically, one makes the generalization to arbitrary entangled states, but does so by restricting to
perfectly correlated measurements, i.e., measurements whose corresponding operator is diagonal in a Schmidt
basis. To obtain this result, one further needs to extend the framework of ontic models. This is done in the
next subsection.
11See also (Barrett, Kent, and Pironio, 2006) and references therein for the use of chained Bell inequalities.
12This result later became known as the free will theorem by Conway and Kochen (2006, 2009).
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4.2 The extended equiprobability theorem
The scenario of the extended equiprobability theorem is again a pair of d-level quantum systems, but now we
consider an arbitrary state ψSd . Instead of arbitrary local measurements, one now only considers measurements
whose corresponding operator is diagonal with respect to some orthonormal basis (ei)
d
i=1 for C
d such that
ψSd =
d∑
i=1
ciei ⊗ ei, (17)
for some numbers ci.
13 The strategy to prove that the λ-probabilities for these measurements should equal the
quantum probabilities relies on coupling the pair of systems to a pair of D-level systems. The combined system
is then brought to a state that is approximately maximally entangled and then the equiprobability theorem
is applied so probabilities for local measurements should then approximately equal 1
D
. These probabilities are
then related to the λ-probabilities for the initial pair of systems, which can then be approximated to have the
value ni
D
≈ |ci|2.
To deal with the notion of coupling one system to another, one needs a way to translate the ontic models
for two (or more) quantum systems to the ontic model for the joint quantum system. Here enters the idea for
what will be called a complete ontic model.14
Definition 3. A complete ontic model for quantum mechanics is a collection of ontic models, with one ontic
model for every finite-dimensional quantum system. For every pair of quantum systems with Hilbert spaces H1
and H2 and for any system with Hilbert space H1⊗H2 there is for each preparation P2 of the second system a
Markov kernel γP2 from the ontic model (Λ1,Σ1) for the first system to the ontic model (Λ12,Σ12) for the joint
system such that for every preparation P1 of the first system the probability measure µP1P2 defined as
µP1P2(∆) :=
∫
γP2(∆|λ)dµP1 (λ) (18)
corresponds to some preparation P1P2 of the joint system such that if P1 is represented by the quantum state
ρ1 and P2 by ρ2, then P1P2 is represented by ρ1 ⊗ ρ2.
A complete ontic model is said to satisfy parameter independence if all its ontic models satisfy parameter
independence.
One can think of the Markov kernel γP2 as modeling the act of appending an ancilla prepared according to
P2 to the initial system. It provides a translation from the ontic model for the initial system to the ontic model
for the joint system. It seems natural to demand that the description of the initial system in the ontic model
for the joint system, now considered as a subsystem, should be at least as rich as its description in the initial
ontic model. The assumption of ancilla independence captures this intuition.
Definition 4. A complete ontic model is said to satisfy ancilla independence when λ-probabilities for an
individual system arise as averages of λ-probabilities for local measurements on a joint system. Specifically, for
every response function pMA in the initial ontic model there is a response function pMA⊗1 in the ontic model
for the joint system such that for every preparation P2 for a second system
pMA(a|λ) =
∫
pMA⊗1(a|λ˜)γP2(dλ˜|λ) (19)
for all possible measurement outcomes a and all ontic states λ ∈ Λ1.
At first sight the notion of ancilla independence may be reminiscent of preparation independence as adopted
in the PBR theorem, since the validity of (19) is independent of the choice of P2. Note though that unlike
preparation independence, which relies on the Cartesian product assumption (ibid., p. 100), ancilla indepen-
dence does not have direct implications for the structure of the set of ontic states for the joint system and how
these ontic states relate to the ontic states for the individual systems. It seems to me that ancilla independence
is a reasonable assumption. Either way, it is needed to prove the extended equiprobability theorem.
Theorem 2 (Extended equiprobability theorem). For any complete ontic model that satisfies ancilla indepen-
dence and parameter independence let an ontic model for a pair of d-level systems with d ≥ 2 be given and let ψSd
be any quantum state for the pair. Then the ontic model must be trivial with respect to the set of preparations
that are represented by ψSd and the set of local measurements whose corresponding operator is diagonal in an
orthonormal basis (ei)
d
i=1 for which (17) holds for some numbers ci.
13Note that in the case where ψS
d
is a maximally entangled state, we again obtain the set of all local measurements. On the other
hand, if ψS
d
= e⊗ e, then the only local measurements considered are those whose corresponding operator has e as an eigenstate.
14This definition is based on Leifer’s proposal for how to deal with appending ancillas in ontic models (Leifer, 2014, §8.2), which
is also relevant for his proof of Claim 2.
7
A proof for this theorem is presented in Appendix B. As far as I know it is the first fully rigorous proof
of this type of theorem. Of course, the theorem as presented here is strictly speaking new simply because it
is formulated in the language of ontic models. It also does not map directly onto earlier theorems and proofs
because the strategy for purported proofs for Claim 1 have variations. Nevertheless, some general remarks can
be made.
The criticism of Landsman (2015) pertaining to earlier proofs by Colbeck and Renner can be traced to the
fact that the proof makes use of three limiting operations that are intertwined and that Colbeck and Renner
appear to rely on special mathematical properties of the formalism of quantum mechanics to deal with these
limiting operations. Landsman partly deals with these issues by resorting to strong assumptions, which he takes
to be part of the analysis of Colbeck and Renner, but only now are being made explicit. For example, one key
strategy of the proof is to couple the initial pair of systems to another pair of dǫ-level systems. This second
pair is then evolved to a state that is close to a maximally entangled state. And although the equiprobability
theorem only applies to exactly maximally entangled states, it is nevertheless applied. Landsman uses here the
assumption of continuity of probabilities (based on the idea that the Born rule is continuous) to bridge the gap.
Leegwater (2016) at first sight seems to avoid this issue by working in the limit where the dǫ-level systems
can evolve to a maximally entangled state. This evolution in turn relies on coupling the two pairs of systems
to a third pair of D-level systems. As D → ∞, the entangled state for the dǫ-level systems tends towards the
maximally entangled state. But it is not clear whether working in the limit D = ∞ is legitimate since the
proof of the equiprobability theorem itself relies on a limiting operation: the chained Bell inequalities (this is
the second limiting operation). The final limiting operation is that of approximating the quantum probabilities
|ci|2 with rational numbers nidǫ where the approximation becomes better as dǫ → ∞. Here again Leegwater is
not very clear about whether the limit dǫ →∞ can directly be applied to a result that itself relies on a limiting
operation. These issues are avoided in the proof in Appendix B, where all limiting operations are postponed to
the final steps, and where it also becomes clear that in fact these operations are intertwined.
5 Completeness for individual systems
The idea of a completeness proof for individual quantum systems seems peculiar given that non-trivial ontic
models for arbitrary d-level quantum systems have been around since the work of Bell (1966) and Gudder
(1970). Trivially, these models may be assumed to satisfy parameter independence since there is no second
system in play with which it could interact. So strictly speaking these models are counterexamples to Claim 1.
The lack of a description of interaction in these models may be considered to be a serious deficiency. In fact,
in light of the extended equiprobability theorem, it seems that Claim 1 should at least be reformulated to the
weaker
Claim 3. In any complete ontic model that satisfies ancilla independence and parameter independence every
ontic model is ψ-complete.
In principle, one can imagine that under certain minimal assumptions on interactions, parameter indepen-
dence becomes applicable and ontic models necessarily have to become trivial. This seems at least to be the
aim of Colbeck and Renner, and so it is useful to investigate how their strategy is supposed to work.
Consider an individual quantum system with Hilbert space H1 = Cd and a preparation corresponding to
the pure state
ψ1 =
d∑
i=1
ciei, (20)
for some orthonormal basis {e1, . . . , ed}. The focus is on a possible measurement represented by a complete
self-adjoint operator A =
∑d
i=1 ai[ei]. It is straightforward to devise an ontic model for this system that is
non-trivial with respect to this measurement for this state. That is, a model in which∫ ∣∣∣pA(ai|λ) − |ci|2∣∣∣ dµψ1(λ) 6= 0. (21)
This is in striking contrast to the consequence of the extended equiprobability theorem which says that for any
ontic model for a pair of such systems (that is part of an appropriate complete ontic model) one has∫ ∣∣∣pA⊗1(ai|λ)− |ci|2∣∣∣ dµψS
d
(λ) = 0 (22)
with ψSd as in (17). Could it be possible to argue from this that any ontic model for the individual system in
which (21) is the case should be rejected?
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The step needed to make the connection is most explicit in the work of Leegwater (2016, §8).15 Instead of
looking at A⊗1 the focus is on 1⊗B where B =∑di=1 bi[ei]. By Theorem 1 the relevant analogue of (22) also
holds for measurements represented by this operator. The step is then that since “by definition”16
P(ai|A,ψ1) = P(bi|1⊗B,ψSd ) (23)
“the same relation holds when considering λ-probabilities:”
pψ1A (ai|, λ) = pψ
S
d
1⊗B(bi|λ). (24)
Presumably, (24) is supposed to imply that (21) cannot hold in any ontic model that is part of a complete
ontic model that satisfies ancilla independence and parameter independence. Whether this is the case of course
depends on what (24) exactly expresses. This is not entirely trivial as a formal definition of the expression is
lacking.
As a first step in fleshing out what (24) means, assume that the inference from (23) to (24) is valid if and
only if the inference from
P(ai|A,ψ1) = P(ai|A⊗ 1, ψSd ) (25)
to
pψ1A (ai|λ) = pψ
S
d
A⊗1(ai|λ) (26)
is valid. This is reasonable since if one inference holds, then, by the extended equiprobability theorem, the other
holds as well.
In quantum mechanics (25) holds as a consequence of the mathematical structure of the theory and how it
deals with composing joint systems out of individual systems. But it is important to note that the equation
expresses a numerical equivalence of two probabilities that are defined in separate models. The objects A and
ψ1 belong to the quantum model for the individual system while A⊗ 1 and ψSd belong to the pair model. The
fact that the same symbol P is used on both sides of the equation does not mean that the equation establishes
the equality of two values a single function takes on for two distinct arguments; the two functions are distinct.
To have a similar link between λ-probabilities of bipartite systems and λ-probabilities of their parts, one has
to suppose that the ontic models for all relevant systems are part of (something like) a complete ontic model.
But even then it is not clear what it means for the same λ to appear on both sides of the equation, just as
it wouldn’t make sense to have the same quantum state on both sides of the equation in (25). These are just
some preliminary considerations for tackling the real issue at hand, namely, that the objects on both sides of
(26) also are not well-defined. As these issues are intertwined I will deal with them simultaneously.
A small part of the problem stems from trying to analyze (26) in the language of ontic models, while Colbeck,
Renner and Leegwater take a different approach. On their approach, both ψ1 and λ are possible values for
random variables, as is the measurement setting and the measurement outcome. Then pψ1A (ai|λ) expresses the
probability of obtaining the outcome ai conditional on the quantum state being ψ1 and the measurement being
A and something else being λ.17 It may be possible that they intend the random variable that determines the
quantum state to not just range over states for a specific Hilbert space, but also across different Hilbert spaces.
Then both ψ1 and ψ
S
d are possible values and so there is a well-defined probability that the system will be a
single d-level system and a well-defined probability that it will be a pair, determined by the single function p.
But this idea will be avoided here.
Another important distinction is that Colbeck, Renner and Leegwater do not presuppose that λ provides
all relevant information concerning the system and so “adding” ψ to λ may give more information about the
possible outcomes. This explains the occurrence of quantum states in (26). Informally speaking, the quantum
state may also be taken to give relevant information within the use of an ontic model. As it specifies the
preparation of the system, it may indicate what behavior of λ may be considered to be “typical”. So the
notation in (26) may be interpreted as providing a convenient way of specifying a constraint on the possible
λ’s. A way to make this precise, is to assume (like Landsman (2015)) that λ-probabilities with quantum states
attached to them express equations that hold µψ1-almost surely, i.e.,
pψ1A (ai|λ) = f(λ)
⇐⇒∫
|pA(ai|λ) − f(λ)| dµψ1(λ) = 0.
(27)
15In (Colbeck and Renner, 2011) the relevant step connects to assumption QMb in the supplementary material and in (Colbeck
and Renner, 2015) it is discussed in section 6.
16The notation of the equations (23) and (24) has been adjusted to fit the notation in this paper.
17It may be noted here that even within their framework, the λ-probability with ψ sticked to it is only well-defined if the
conjunction of A, ψ1 and λ has non-zero probability.
9
This helps in clarifying how to interpret both sides of (26). It does not help yet in interpreting what equality
between the two means. A problem with (26) is that it refers to two distinct quantum states (never mind that
they also belong to distinct Hilbert spaces). Landsman (2015) doubles down on the almost surely interpretation
here and proposes the definition
pψ1A (ai|λ) = pψ
S
d
A⊗1(ai|λ)
⇐⇒
∀f : pψ1A (ai|λ) = f(λ) iff pψ
S
d
A⊗1(ai|λ) = f(λ).
(28)
A first problem here is that, in the current setting, this is still not well-defined as the λ’s belong to distinct
ontic models and so it is not clear what kind of function f could even have the proper domain. But even if
that issue can be resolved, (28) is an unreasonably strong assumption, as it implies that if (26) holds, then
pA(ai|λ) = pA⊗1(ai|λ) both µψ1-almost surely and µψS
d
-almost surely. Moreover, distributions for µψ1 and µψS
d
completely overlap on the region of Λ where pA(ai|λ) is non-zero.18 This is in strong tension with results like the
BCLM theorem (Barrett, Cavalcanti, et al., 2014), which demonstrate that overlaps should become arbitrarily
small as d increases.
A solution to the problem can be found in the work of Leegwater (2016), and it overlaps with the solution
to the double use of λ for physically distinct systems. In the discussion of some of the notation used that is
similar to that occurring in (26), Leegwater notes:
here λ still refers to the variable assigned to system A when it was in the state |ψ〉A [. . . ] λ always
refers to the original system A, and there is only one measure µ(λ) that is considered. [p.21]
The measure µ refers to a probability distribution over Λ that may depend on |ψ〉A as well as other factors.
Given that there is only one measure considered, which is related to a particular quantum state, all other
quantum states should be understood as being arrived at after interactions with a system prepared according
to |ψ〉A.
Translating this to the present discussion, it implies that p
ψSd
A⊗1(ai|λ) refers to a single d-level system that
was initially prepared in the quantum state ψ1 and having ontic state λ, then was coupled to a second d-level
system with unknown state and then a transformation on the joint system was performed yielding the quantum
state ψSd . Within a complete ontic model this process can be modeled. For sake of definiteness, assume that
the second system was prepared according to the quantum state φ. Appending this system to the first one is
then modeled by a Markov kernel γφ from the initial ontic model to the model for the joint system. Now let
U be a unitary operator such that U(ψ1 ⊗ φ) = ψSd and let γU be a Markov kernel that models it. A proper
reformulation of (26) is then that19
pA(ai|λ) =
∫∫
pA⊗1(ai|λ˜)γU (dλ˜|λ′)γφ(dλ′|λ) (29)
holds µψ1-almost surely.
This reconstruction seems to be on the right track. If the inference from (25) to (29) is valid, then the
extended equiprobability theorem can be used to prove the completeness claim. Since µTU◦Tφ◦Pψ1 corresponds
to a preparation that can be represented by the state ψSd , it follows that pA⊗1(ai|λ˜) is almost surely equal to
the quantum probability |ci|2 with respect to this measure. It then follows from (29) that pA(ai|λ) is equal to
the quantum probability µψ1-almost surely. The remaining question is then why the inference from (25) to (29)
should be valid. In the next section I argue that no uncontroversial arguments are available.
6 Unitary processes and measurements
6.1 A valid alternative to Claim 1
It is not obvious from the works of Colbeck, Renner and Leegwater what should be taken to be the main
argument for the inference from (25) to (29). To get a handle on what it takes for (29) to hold, I show that it
18This may be seen as follows. The first claim follows from evaluating (28) for the choice f(λ) = pA(ai|λ). The second claim
follows with a proof from contradiction. If there exists a ∆ ⊂ Λ such that µψS
d
(∆) > 0 = µψ1 (∆) and on which pA⊗1(ai|λ) is
non-zero, then for any f such that pψ1
A
(ai|λ) = f(λ) and p
ψSd
A⊗1
(ai|λ) = f(λ) one can define an f
′ that differs from f only on ∆ in
such a way that p
ψSd
A⊗1
(ai|λ) = f
′(λ) no longer holds. So (26) would fail.
19Note that both integrals are over the ontic states for the joint system, while λ is an ontic state for the initial system.
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can be derived with the help of two assumptions. The first assumption is ancilla independence as introduced
in section 4. The second I call unitary invariance. In spirit it is similar to the assumption of unitary invariance
adopted by Landsman (2015), but it avoids problems similar to those related to (28).
Definition 5. An ontic model is said to satisfy unitary invariance if for every ρ, U,A, a
Tr (ρ[a]A) = Tr (UρU
∗[a]A)
=⇒
pMA(a|λ) =
∫
pMA(a|λ˜)γTU (dλ˜|λ) µPρ-a.s.
(30)
This definition states that, given some preparation represented by ρ, whenever some transformation does
not alter the probabilities for a particular measurement and outcome according to quantum mechanics, then
also the λ-probabilities are not altered by the transformation (almost surely with respect to the preparation).20
With these assumptions (29) can indeed be derived:21
∫ ∣∣∣∣pA(ai|λ)−
∫∫
pA⊗1(ai|λ˜)γU◦φ(dλ˜|λ)
∣∣∣∣ dµψ1(λ)
=
∫ ∣∣∣∣
∫
pA⊗1(ai|λ′)γφ(dλ′|λ) −
∫∫
pA⊗1(ai|λ˜)γU◦φ(dλ˜|λ)
∣∣∣∣ dµψ1(λ)
≤
∫∫ ∣∣∣∣pA⊗1(ai|λ′)−
∫
pA⊗1(ai|λ˜)γU (dλ˜|λ′)
∣∣∣∣ γφ(dλ′|λ)dµψ1(λ)
=
∫ ∣∣∣∣pA⊗1(ai|λ) −
∫
pA⊗1(ai|λ˜)γU (dλ˜|λ)
∣∣∣∣ dµψ1⊗φ(λ) = 0.
(31)
We thus obtain a proof for the following theorem (which is to be contrasted to Claim 1 and Claim 3):
Theorem 3. In any complete ontic model that satisfies ancilla independence, unitary invariance and parameter
independence every ontic model is ψ-complete.
The value of this theorem depends on whether unitary invariance is a reasonable assumption.22 However,
it is not trivial to come up with a motivation for unitary invariance. This is problematic, as this assumption
on its own has immediate consequences that are quite crucially related to the notion of completeness. Note
that completeness boils down to the idea that response functions are dispersion free under preparations of pure
quantum states. Now consider the example where 〈ψ|[a]A|ψ〉 = 〈Uψ|[a]A|Uψ〉. Unitary invariance then has the
following consequence for the dispersion of any corresponding response function:
Varψ(pA(a| . )) =
∫
pA(a|λ)2dµψ(λ)−
(∫
pA(a|λ)dµψ(λ)
)2
=
∫ (∫
pA(a|λ˜)γU (dλ˜|λ)
)2
dµψ(λ)−
(∫∫
pA(a|λ˜)γU (λ˜|λ)dµψ(λ)
)2
≤
∫∫
pA(a|λ˜)2γU (dλ˜|λ)dµψ(λ) −
(∫∫
pA(a|λ˜)γU (λ˜|λ)dµψ(λ)
)2
=VarUψ(pA(a| . )).
(32)
It follows that if one can show that for some quantum state Uψ the response function is dispersion free for
a particular measurement, then the response function must also be dispersion free for any other quantum state
ψ whenever the operational probabilities for the measurement are equal. Since this gets at the heart of the
Colbeck-Renner completeness claim, this implicit assumption should have at least been explicitly stated and
preferably be well-motivated. Neither appears to be the case though.
20It is not to be confused with the notion of transformation noncontextuality (Spekkens, 2005), which states that if two trans-
formation affect all the operational probabilities in the same way, then they should also affect all the λ-probabilities in the same
way.
21Here U is as before, i.e., U(ψ1 ⊗ φ) = ψDs . Ancilla independence is used in the first step, unitary invariance is used in the final
step.
22Assuming for convenience that the reader does think setting independence and parameter independence are reasonable assump-
tions.
11
6.2 An appeal to measurement theory
The crucial inferences that implicitly rely on unitary invariance occur in the setting where measurement pro-
cedures are considered (Colbeck and Renner, 2011, p.4-5), (Colbeck and Renner, 2015, p.515) and (Leegwater,
2016, §8). Possibly then, an appeal to measurement procedures can help motivate unitary invariance or some
weaker version thereof. Arguably, an appeal to what actually happens in a measurement process is not a very
elegant strategy in a theory that is infamous for its measurement problem. One should be careful not to adopt
assumptions for the ontic model that don’t sit well within quantum mechanics itself.
Ontic models are usually not designed to resolve the measurement problem, as the Beltrametti-Bugajski
model nicely illustrates. More generally, in any ontic model probabilities for outcomes of measurements are
well-defined without any mentioning of how the relevant system would interact with a measurement apparatus.
Ideally, this peculiarity is to be solved in a complete ontic model. The λ-probability pM (a|λ) then encodes
the probability with which the system, upon interaction with an appropriate measurement apparatus, would
evolve towards a joint state in which the measurement apparatus can be taken to be in a well-defined pointer
state displaying the outcome of the measurement. Explicitly, if ∆Ma denotes the set of ontic states of the joint
system in which the apparatus displays the outcome a, then ideally there is a Markov kernel γM modeling the
interaction between system and apparatus such that
pM (a|λ) = γM
(
∆Ma
∣∣λ) . (33)
A motivation for unitary invariance in the context of measurements could then boil down to an assumption
concerning γM .
That an appeal to measurement processes can be relevant for unitary invariance can be seen from a simple
example. According to quantum theory, instead of directly measuring A on the initial system in the state ψ1,
one may equivalently first entangle it with a second system to obtain the joint state ψSd and measure instead
B on the second system. The unitary process here is non-disturbing with respect to the observable measured.
Unitary invariance comes down to the idea that this is also always a legitimate procedure for the ontic model.
However, the inference from operational non-disturbance to non-disturbance on the level of ontic models is
known to be problematic (Maroney, 2017).
An appeal to measurement processes to motivate the general validity of unitary invariance thus seems
implausible. However, for the proof of Theorem 3 it is only used in certain special circumstances. Given a system
and a measurement A and outcome ai, it needs to be shown that the λ-probability pA(ai|λ) equals the quantum
probability almost surely (with respect to the preparation of the quantum state). What happens on the level of
the ontic model is that during the measurement procedure the system evolves according to γM . Now, if one could
argue that γM actually involves a unitary process by which the system plus apparatus evolve to the quantum
state ψSd after which the outcome is read of from the apparatus, then maybe the extended equiprobability
theorem can be applied and one can conclude that indeed pA(ai|λ) equals the quantum probability almost
surely.
The transition from ψ1 to ψ
S
d is of course well-known as part of the von Neumann measurement scheme.
The usual problem is then that the state ψSd , on its own, does not signify a situation in which a measurement
outcome is obtained. Single world unitary quantum mechanics without hidden variables is not compatible with
the assumption that measurements have definite outcomes.
The question is how the measurement process γM relates to the von Neumann-type process γU ◦ γφ. And
this may of course depend on how the complete ontic model is supposed to solve the measurement problem.23
In a spontaneous collapse theory, the macroscopic superposition ψSd is extremely unlikely to obtain and γM
contains a collapse way before the unitary evolution U is completed. Consequently, an appeal to measurements
is irrelevant for the question whether Claim 3 applies to such theories and a general assumption like unitary
invariance is required instead.
To be fair, in the first paper Colbeck and Renner (2011) did assume that “all processes within quantum
theory can be considered as unitary evolutions”. Although this explicit statement is dropped in any of the
following papers, a charitable reading is that the completeness claim was never meant to apply to collapse
theories.24 But even if it is accepted that γM should correspond to a unitary process, it is not obvious that
it should be operationally equivalent to γU ◦ γφ (i.e., can be represented by the same unitary operator). As
an alternative process, consider some unitary operation U ′ that evolves the total system to a state of the form
23It is not entirely clear if Colbeck and Renner expect the alternative theory to solve the measurement problem. Doing so would
seem unreasonable as it sets a higher standard for the alternative theory than adopted for quantum mechanics. But not doing so
makes the appeal to measurement processes quite awkward. Regardless, the following arguments do not rely on whether or not γM
actually satisfies (33). It just denotes the measurement process in the ontic model, whatever it may be.
24It may be noted that by such a step it must be conceded that the theorem of Colbeck and Renner is not on an equal footing
with results like Bell’s theorem, the Kochen-Specker theorem or the PBR theorem.
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∑d
i=1 ciχ ⊗ ei for some arbitrary pure state χ. This represents as much a process in which the final state
describes an apparatus that displays the outcome ai with probability |ci|2 as does the operation U . And there
is no principled reason that in ontic models the measurement process γM can not be of this form.
25 And if it
is, the extended equiprobability theorem cannot be applied.26
Thus we obtain again a further restriction on the set of complete ontic models to which the theorem is
to be applied. The models must be such that all processes correspond to unitary processes and measurement
processes like γM necessarily lead to entangled states with perfect correlations. To see if at least this claim is
valid, it is worthwhile to quickly recap what the argument for it has become. The procedure to measure A on a
system, involves hooking it up to a measurement device, evolving the joint system to ψSd and then reading of the
value of B from the device. Reading of this value constitutes a measurement of B on the measurement device.
Because in a no-collapse theory with von Neumann measurement processes this is roughly what it means to
measure A, the outcome statistics for B on the joint system should equal the outcome statistics for A. But, if
in addition the criteria for the extended equiprobability theorem are in place, then the outcome statistics for B
should be equal to the quantum statistics and so also the statistics for A should equal the quantum statistics.
Applicability of the extended equiprobability theorem requires parameter independence. Thus it has to be
assumed that it is possible to postpone the B-measurement until system and apparatus are again spatially
separated. Moreover, at this stage it should also be possible to refrain from performing a B-measurement, and
instead perform any other measurement on the apparatus and, in addition, to perform any other measurement
on the system as well. If not, the chained Bell-inequalities upon which the proof for Theorem 2 rests cannot
come off the ground.
It first may be acknowledged that in unitary quantum mechanics it should be possible in principle to entangle
a system with an apparatus, then spatially separate them and in turn perform arbitrary measurements on both
systems. It is of course not clear how we are to understand a measurement on an apparatus that is not a
measurement in the pointer basis, just like it is difficult to measure a cat in a basis that contains superpositions
of life and death states. But we should not let such psychological worries affect our judgments.
Thus there should be a process γU ◦ γφ in the ontic model that establishes an entangled state for the joint
system such that after which any measurement can be performed on each of the components of the system.
Is it reasonable to think of γM as such a process? Here it is good to remind ourselves that in an ontic model
the physical quantities may correspond only to dispositional properties.27 The process γM may be seen to be
special in the sense that it brings about such a dispositional property.28
Now once a certain dispositional property is brought about, it is not per se meaningful to say that disposi-
tional properties before the measurement encoded by other response functions are still there. What we can have
is an effective collapse. This is akin to an Everettian multiverse view. In that scenario, once we have done a
measurement we find ourselves in a branch that is “cut off” from other branches. Whatever future processes we
may apply to the system after branching, these processes apply only to the branch we find ourselves on. Future
measurements do no longer bring about dispositional properties of the system prior to the first measurement,
but only of a branched off version of the system. In a single world universe, the idea is that once a context of
measurement has been brought about, we have cut ourselves off from other possible contexts.29 This idea is
of course very Bohrian in spirit. In fact, Bohr’s response to Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, when taken out of
context, seems strangely apt to qualify the issue regarding the stage when ψSd obtains, if one changes just one
word, and it is perfectly fit to serve as the main conclusion of this paper:
But even at this stage there is essentially the question of an influence on the very conditions which
define the possible types of predictions regarding the future behavior of the system. Since these
conditions constitute an inherent element of the description of any phenomenon to which the term
“physical reality” can properly be attached, we see that the argumentation of the mentioned authors
does not justify their conclusion that the quantum-mechanical description is essentially [complete].
(Bohr, 1935, p.700)
25I picked up this idea from (Wallace, 2019), which contains more insightful discussion of what “orthodox quantum mechanics”
should be taken to mean.
26One may be inclined to insist that within quantum mechanics such a unitary process U ′ does not represent a measurement.
But that is beside the point, as we are considering here possible measurement processes within ontic models for which the only
criterion is that the Born rule probabilities are reproduced.
27This separates ontic models from more traditional hidden variable models, in which value definiteness of physical quantities is
usually taken to be among the criteria.
28This is not necessarily re-introducing the measurement problem. What is special about γM is that it brings about value
definiteness, and it is reasonable to take that as a necessary requirement for the processes that we call measurements.
29One might worry that this idea leads to possible conflicts with unitary quantum mechanics (on some specific reading of what
unitary quantum mechanics actually is). But all I am using here is the, I think, uncontroversial idea that, if I read the outcome
on a measurement device twice, then with probability one the second reading corresponds to the first reading, even if the quantum
state has not collapsed to the corresponding eigenstate. This is just what effective collapse means.
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A Proof of the equiprobability theorem
In this appendix the equiprobability theorem is proven. For convenience the theorem is formulated again here.
Theorem. Consider the quantum system of a pair of d-level systems. Any ontic model for this system that
satisfies parameter independence is trivial w.r.t. MLOC and all preparations represented by the state
ψd =
d∑
i=1
1√
d
ei ⊗ ei.
Proof. Throughout, assume that µψd is an arbitrary, but fixed, probability measure corresponding to a prepara-
tion of ψd. First consider a complete local measurementMA with possible outcomes a1, a2, . . . , ad corresponding
to the operator A ⊗ 1. For the state ψd, the probability for each possible outcome is 1d . To show that the λ-
probabilities are identical, it suffices to show that the λ-probabilities for all possible outcomes are equal:
∫ ∣∣pMA(ai|λ) − 1d ∣∣ dµψd(λ) = 1d
∫ ∣∣∣∣∣∣dpMA(ai|λ)−
d∑
j=1
pMA(aj |λ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ dµψd(λ)
≤ 1
d
d∑
j=1
∫
|pMA(ai|λ)− pMA(aj |λ)| dµψd(λ).
(34)
So it remains to be shown that ∫
|pMA(ai|λ) − pMA(aj |λ)| dµψd(λ) = 0 (35)
for all i, j.
Without loss of generality, it may be assumed that each ei is an eigenstate for A for the eigenvalue ai.
Let B =
∑d
i=1 bi[ei] be a second arbitrary complete self-adjoint operator and let MB be a local measurement
corresponding to the operator 1⊗B.
Now let i, j be given. If i = j, then (35) holds trivially, so assume i 6= j. For θ ∈ [0, π2 ] the unitary operator
Uθ is defined by the actions
Uθei = cos θei + sin θej , Uθej = cos θej − sin θei, Uθek = ek when k 6= i, j. (36)
Further define
Aθ := UθAU
∗
θ , Bθ := UθBU
∗
θ (37)
and letMAθ andMBθ denote local measurements corresponding to the operators Aθ⊗1 and 1⊗Bθ respectively.
For simplicity, it may be assumed that MA0 = MA, and the M will be dropped in the notation.
For every N ∈ N the angle between [0, π2 ] can be divided in 2N + 1 equal sized smaller angles. For n ≤ N
set
AN,n = A 2nπ
(2N+1)2
, BN,n = B 2(n+1)π
(2N+1)2
. (38)
This is used to make the estimate∫
|pA(ai|λ)− pA(aj |λ)| dµψd(λ)
≤
N∑
n=0
∫ ∣∣pAN,n(ai|λ)− pBN,n(bi|λ)∣∣ dµψd(λ) + N−1∑
n=0
∫ ∣∣pBN,n(bi|λ)− pAN,n+1(ai|λ)∣∣ dµψd(λ)
+
∫ ∣∣∣pB π
2
(bi|λ) − pA(aj |λ)
∣∣∣ dµψd(λ).
(39)
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The final term in (39) equals zero. To show this, parameter independence is used to make the estimate
pB π
2
(bi|λ)− pA(aj |λ) =
d∑
k=1
pA⊗Bπ
2
(ak, bi|λ)−
d∑
l=1
pA⊗Bπ
2
(aj , bl|λ)
=
∑
k 6=j
pA⊗Bπ
2
(ak, bi|λ)−
∑
l 6=i
pA⊗Bπ
2
(aj , bl|λ)
≤
∑
k 6=j
pA⊗Bπ
2
(ak, bi|λ) +
∑
l 6=i
pA⊗Bπ
2
(aj , bl|λ).
(40)
Using this, it follows that∫ ∣∣∣pB π
2
(bi|λ) − pA(aj |λ)
∣∣∣ dµψd(λ) ≤∑
k 6=j
∫
pA⊗Bπ
2
(ak, bi|λ)µψd(λ) +
∑
l 6=i
∫
pA⊗Bπ
2
(aj , bl|λ)µψd(λ)
=
∑
k 6=j
〈
ψd
∣∣[ek ⊗ U π2 ei]∣∣ψd〉+∑
l 6=i
〈
ψd
∣∣[U π
2
ej ⊗ el]
∣∣ψd〉
=
∑
k 6=j
〈ψd|[ek ⊗ ej ]|ψd〉+
∑
l 6=i
〈ψd|[ei ⊗ el]|ψd〉 = 0,
(41)
where the final step follows from the perfect correlations in ψd.
For the other 2N + 1 terms in (39) the correlations are not perfect. But with parameter independence one
still has for each term the estimate∫ ∣∣pAθ (ai|λ) − pBφ(bi|λ)∣∣ dµψd(λ) ≤∑
k 6=i
∫
pAθ⊗Bφ(ai, bk|λ)µψd(λ) +
∑
l 6=i
∫
pAθ⊗Bφ(al, bi|λ)µψd(λ)
=
∑
k 6=i
〈ψd|[Uθei ⊗ Uφek]|ψd〉+
∑
l 6=i
〈ψd|[Uθel ⊗ Uφei]|ψd〉
= 〈ψd|[Uθei ⊗ Uφej]|ψd〉+ 〈ψd|[Uθej ⊗ Uφei]|ψd〉 .
(42)
And for the expectation values one has
〈ψd|[Uθei ⊗ Uφej ]|ψd〉 = 1
d
∑
k=i,j
∑
l=i,j
〈ek ⊗ ek|[Uθei ⊗ Uφej ]|el ⊗ el〉
=
1
d
∑
k=i,j
∑
l=i,j
〈ek|Uθei〉 〈ek|Uφej〉 〈Uθei|el〉 〈Uφej|el〉
=
1
d
∑
k=i,j
〈ek|Uθei〉 〈ek|Uφej〉 (cos θ sinφ− sin θ cosφ)
=
1
d
(cos θ sinφ− sin θ cosφ)2 = 1
d
sin2(φ− θ).
(43)
Making use of the fact that for all the 2N + 1 terms in (39) |θ − φ| = π(2N+1)2 :∫
|pA(ai|λ)− pA(aj |λ)| dµψd(λ) ≤ (2N + 1)
2
d
sin2
(
π
(2N + 1)2
)
≤ π
2
2d(2N + 1)
. (44)
Since this holds for all N ∈ N, the proof for (35) is complete.
Finally, consider the case where A is a non-maximal operator. Assume again that each ei is an eigenstate
for A. Let ak be any eigenvalue for A with degeneracy nk and complete set of eigenstates ei1 , . . . , eink . Let B
be a complete self-adjoint operator as before. Then
∫ ∣∣∣pA(ak|λ)− nk
d
∣∣∣dµψd(λ) ≤
∫ ∣∣∣∣∣∣pA(ak|λ)−
nk∑
j=1
pB(bij |λ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ dµψd(λ) +
∫ ∣∣∣∣∣∣
nk∑
j=1
(
pB(bij |λ)−
1
d
)∣∣∣∣∣∣ dµψd(λ). (45)
The first term equals zero because of the perfect correlations between the outcomes and that the second term
equals zero follows by applying (35) with A replaced by B.
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B Proof of the extended equiprobability theorem
Theorem 4. Consider the quantum system of a pair of d-level systems and the entangled state
ψSd :=
d∑
i=1
ciei ⊗ ei ∈ HA ⊗HB ≃ Cd ⊗ Cd. (46)
In a complete ontic model that satisfies ancilla independence and parameter independence, every ontic model
for the system pair must be trivial with respect to all preparations that are represented by ψSd and all local
measurements whose corresponding operator is diagonal in the orthonormal basis (ei)
d
i=1.
Proof.
Setup The main strategy of the proof is to reshape the situation such that the proof strategy of the equiprob-
ability theorem can be adopted. There are then two entwined issues that need to be faced.
First, the proof of Theorem 1 relies on the state being maximally entangled. To solve this issue, one uses the
method of embezzlement (Dam and Haden, 0203). The system is coupled to a second pair of systems prepared
in a special entangled state. Then, by applying only local unitary operations, one can transform the initial state
to a state that is arbitrarily close to any desired entangled state.
The second problem is that the equiprobability theorem yields equal probabilities, whereas now arbitrary
Born probabilities with values |ci|2 are to be derived. This is solved by approximating these probabilities with
sums of equal probabilities, which now pertain to yet another pair of systems coupled to the initial pair.
Without loss of generality, it may be assumed that the basis vectors ei are such that all the ci are positive
reals. Now let MA be a complete local measurement with corresponding operator A ⊗ 1 and A =
∑d
i=1 ai[ei].
The aim is to show that for any E > 0 ∫ ∣∣pA(ai|λ)− c2i ∣∣dµψS
d
(λ) < E (47)
for all i = 1, . . . , d.
The first step is to approximate the Born probabilities with rational numbers. For given ǫ > 0, choose
natural numbers nǫ1, . . . , n
ǫ
d such that
30
c2i d
ǫ
nǫi
∈ (1− ǫ, 1 + ǫ), with dǫ :=
d∑
i=1
nǫi , (48)
for all i = 1, . . . , d. The system is then coupled to a pair of systems that is big enough to harbor this ap-
proximation. The Hilbert spaces HǫA,HǫB for these systems are copies of Cm
ǫ
with mǫ := maxi n
ǫ
i and for
each an orthonormal basis f1, f2, . . . , fmǫ is fixed. So the idea is that because
∑nǫi
j=1
1
dǫ
≈ c2i , the initial state
ψSd ∈ HA ⊗HB can be mimicked by the maximally entangled state
ψdǫ :=
d∑
i=1
nǫi∑
j=1
1√
dǫ
fj ⊗ fj ⊗ ei ⊗ ei, (49)
which is an element of HǫA ⊗HǫB ⊗HA ⊗HB.
For any results for the extended system to be relevant for the initial system, it has to evolve towards a state
close to ψdǫ . This is accomplished by an interaction with a third pair of systems with corresponding Hilbert
spaces HNA ,HNB that are copies of CD where
D := N
d∏
i=1
nǫi (50)
and N is a natural number that in the end will be taken to be large enough to have the right relation to E .
For both spaces an orthonormal basis g1, . . . , gD is fixed and it is assumed that the pair is initially prepared
in the state
ψD := CN
D∑
k=1
1√
k
gk ⊗ gk ∈ HNA ⊗HNB , (51)
30How ǫ is to relate to E is made clear at the end of the proof.
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where CN is a normalization constant. The initial state for the totality of six systems is then taken to be
ΨI := CN
D∑
k=1
d∑
i=1
ci√
k
gk ⊗ gk ⊗ f1 ⊗ f1 ⊗ ei ⊗ ei. (52)
Note that although ΨI depends on the parameters ǫ,N , this is suppressed in the notation, as these parameters
are taken to be fixed for the larger part of the proof.
Throughout, the bases will be fixed and a considerable chunk of the proof reduces to manipulations of the
indices of these basis vectors. Therefore it is useful to adopt a notation that highlights the indices:∣∣∣k, k˜∣∣∣j, ˜∣∣∣i, ı˜〉 := gk ⊗ gk˜ ⊗ fj ⊗ f˜ ⊗ ei ⊗ eı˜. (53)
So (52) becomes
ΨI = CN
D∑
k=1
d∑
i=1
ci√
k
|k, k|1, 1|i, i〉 . (54)
In a similar fashion a more compact notation for products of projection operators is also adopted:P1, P2|P3, P4|P5, P6 := P1 ⊗ P2 ⊗ P3 ⊗ P4 ⊗ P5 ⊗ P6. (55)
Coupling the systems The first step is to use the fact that the ontic models are part of a complete ontic
model. So for every N, ǫ there exists a Markov kernel γN,ǫ that translates the probability measure µψS
d
for the
initial ontic model to a probability measure
µΨI(∆) :=
∫
γN,ǫ(∆|λ)dµψS
d
(λ) (56)
for the six systems, that corresponds to a preparation of the state ΨI. Moreover, because of ancilla independence,
the initial response function pA should correspond to some response function p˜A in the larger ontic model such
that
pA(ai|λ) =
∫
p˜A(ai|λ˜)γN,ǫ(dλ˜|λ). (57)
One then has the estimate∫ ∣∣pA(ai|λ) − c2i ∣∣dµψS
d
(λ) =
∫ ∣∣∣∣
∫
p˜A(ai|λ˜)γN,ǫ(dλ˜|λ)− c2i
∣∣∣∣ dµψSd (λ) ≤
∫ ∣∣∣p˜A(ai|λ˜)− c2i ∣∣∣dµψI(λ˜). (58)
So the remainder of the proof focuses entirely on the large system.
Local measurements on the total system The main estimate is obtained by chaining Bell inequalities
for local measurements on the total system. The local measurements needed for the proof, however, can
be conveniently defined in terms of the bases for HǫA,HǫB,HA,HB alone. Consider measurements MA,MB
corresponding to the self-adjoint operators
A :=
d∑
i=1
nǫi∑
j=1
ai,jU
∗PAi,jU, where P
A
i,j :=
1,1|[fj ],1|[ei],1 ,
B :=
d∑
i=1
nǫi∑
j=1
bi,jV
∗PBi,jV, where P
B
i,j :=
1,1|1, [fj]|1, [ei] .
(59)
Here U and V are local unitary operators, i.e., U acts as the unit on the Hilbert spaces HNB ,HǫB,HB and V
acts as the unit on the Hilbert spaces HNA ,HǫA,HA. They are further assumed to have the following action on
specific basis vectors:31
U |k, k|1, 1|i, i〉 =
∣∣∣⌈ knǫi
⌉
, k
∣∣∣ji,k, 1∣∣∣i, i〉 , V |k, k|1, 1|i, i〉 = ∣∣∣k, ⌈ knǫi
⌉∣∣∣1, ji,k∣∣∣i, i〉 , (60)
where
ji,k := k − nǫi
(⌈
k
nǫi
⌉
− 1
)
(61)
31Here ⌈x⌉ denotes the smallest natural number n such that n ≥ x.
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takes on values in the range {1, 2, . . . , nǫi}. It is further convenient to introduce the state
ΨF := UVΨI = CN
D∑
k=1
d∑
i=1
ci√
k
∣∣∣⌈ knǫi
⌉
,
⌈
k
nǫi
⌉∣∣∣ji,k, ji,k∣∣∣i, i〉 . (62)
The theory of embezzlement states that this state becomes a better approximation of ψD ⊗ ψdǫ as N becomes
larger and ǫ becomes smaller. This is, on a formal level, what makes the proof work.
The next step is to make a further estimate picking up again from (58):
∫ ∣∣p˜A(ai|λ)− c2i ∣∣dµΨI(λ) ≤
∫ ∣∣∣∣∣∣p˜A(ai|λ)−
nǫi∑
j=1
pB(bi,j |λ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ dµΨI(λ)
+
∫ ∣∣∣∣∣∣
nǫi∑
j=1
pB(bi,j |λ)−
nǫi
dǫ
∣∣∣∣∣∣dµΨI(λ) +
∫ ∣∣∣∣nǫidǫ − c2i
∣∣∣∣ dµΨI(λ).
(63)
By (48) the final term is smaller than ǫ. The first term will be shown to equal zero. Making use of parameter
independence and the fact that V is a local operator, the standard estimate gives
∫ ∣∣∣∣∣∣p˜A(ai|λ)−
nǫi∑
j=1
pB(bi,j |λ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ dµΨI(λ)
≤
∑
ı˜6=i
nǫı˜∑
j=1
∫
pA,B(ai, bı˜,j|λ)dµΨI(λ) +
∑
ı˜′ 6=i
nǫi∑
j=1
∫
pA,B(aı˜′ , bi,j |λ)dµΨI(λ)
=
∑
ı˜6=i
nǫı˜∑
j=1
〈
VΨI
∣∣∣1,1|1, [fj]|[ei], [eı˜]∣∣∣VΨI〉+∑
ı˜′ 6=i
nǫi∑
j=1
〈
VΨI
∣∣∣1,1|1, [fj]|[eı˜′ ], [ei]∣∣∣VΨI〉 .
(64)
Then each term in the final sum equals zero:〈
VΨI
∣∣∣1,1|1, [fl]|[em], [en]∣∣∣VΨI〉
=C2N
D∑
k,k˜=1
d∑
i,ı˜=1
nǫi∑
j=1
nǫı˜∑
˜=1
cicı˜√
kk˜
〈
gk
∣∣gk˜〉
〈
g⌈ k
nǫ
i
⌉
∣∣∣∣g⌈ k˜
nǫ
ı˜
⌉
〉
〈f1|f1〉
〈
fji,k
∣∣∣[fl]∣∣∣fj
ı˜,k˜
〉
〈ei|[em]|eı˜〉 〈ei|[en]|eı˜〉
=0,
(65)
where the final equality follows because m 6= n.
The conclusion of this step is then that
∫ ∣∣p˜A(ai|λ)− c2i ∣∣dµΨI(λ) <
∫ ∣∣∣∣∣∣
nǫi∑
j=1
pB(bi,j |λ) −
nǫi
dǫ
∣∣∣∣∣∣ dµΨI(λ) + ǫ. (66)
Applying chained Bell inequalities The next step is to find an estimate for the second term on the right
hand side of (63). This is where the strategy for the proof of Theorem 1 is copied. First note that
∫ ∣∣∣∣∣∣
nǫi∑
j=1
pB(bi,j |λ)−
nǫi
dǫ
∣∣∣∣∣∣dµΨI(λ) ≤
nǫi∑
j=1
∫ ∣∣∣∣pB(bi,j |λ)− 1dǫ
∣∣∣∣dµΨI(λ)
≤ 1
dǫ
nǫi∑
j=1
d∑
ı˜=1
nǫı˜∑
˜=1
∫
|pB(bi,j |λ) − pB(bı˜,˜|λ)| dµΨI(λ).
(67)
Next, for fixed values of i, j, ı˜, ˜ and for θ ∈ [0, π/2], two local unitary operators Uθ and Vθ are defined with
the following actions:32
Uθ |k1, k2|j, j2|i, i2〉 = cos θ |k1, k2|j, j2|i, i2〉+ sin θ |k1, k2|˜, j2 |˜ı, i2〉 ,
Uθ |k1, k2|˜, j2 |˜ı, i2〉 = cos θ |k1, k2|˜, j2 |˜ı, i2〉 − sin θ |k1, k2|j, j2|i, i2〉
(68)
32For notational convenience the variables i, j, ı˜, ˜ are suppressed in the expression for these unitary operators.
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and
Vθ |k1, k2|j1, j|i1, i〉 = cos θ |k1, k2|j1, j|i1, i〉+ sin θ |k1, k2|j1, ˜|i1, ı˜〉 ,
Vθ |k1, k2|j1, ˜|i1, ı˜〉 = cos θ |k1, k2|j1, ˜|i1, ı˜〉 − sin θ |k1, k2|j1, j|i1, i〉 ,
(69)
for arbitrary values of k1, k2, j1, j2, i1, i2 and Uθ and Vθ act as the unit operator on all other basis vectors.
For given i, j, ı˜, ˜, θ, two local measurements MAθ and MBθ are introduced corresponding to the operators
Aθ :=
d∑
ι=1
nǫι∑
η=1
aι,ηU
∗U∗θP
A
ι,ηUθU, Bθ :=
d∑
ι=1
nǫι∑
η=1
bι,ηV
∗V ∗θ P
B
ι,ηVθV. (70)
Without loss of generality, it may be assumed that MB0 and MB refer to the same measurement.
For any L ∈ N the angle from 0 to π2 can be divided into 2L + 1 equal smaller angles so as to obtain the
inequality
∫
|pB(bi,j |λ)− pB(bı˜,˜|λ)| dµΨI(λ) ≤
L∑
l=0
∫ ∣∣∣pBL,l(bi,j |λ) − pAL,l(ai,j |λ)
∣∣∣ dµΨI(λ)
+
L−1∑
l=0
∫ ∣∣∣pAL,l(ai,j |λ)− pBL,l+1(bi,j |λ)
∣∣∣ dµΨI(λ)
+
∫ ∣∣∣pAL,L(ai,j |λ)− pB(bı˜,˜|λ)
∣∣∣ dµΨI(λ),
(71)
where
BL,l := B 2lπ
(2L+1)2
and AL,l := A (2l+1)π
(2L+1)2
. (72)
Evaluating each of these terms is somewhat tedious. Therefore the calculations to obtain the following results
are transported to the next section. For the final term one simply has∫ ∣∣∣pAπ
2
(ai,j |λ)− pB(bı˜,˜|λ)
∣∣∣ dµΨI(λ) = 0. (73)
For the other terms one obtains the expression
∫ ∣∣∣pAθ (ai,j |λ)− pBφ(bi,j |λ)
∣∣∣ dµΨI(λ) ≤C2N2
D
nǫ
i∑
m=1
(
c2i (2 sin
2(θ − φ) + sin 2θ sin 2φ)
km,i,j
− cicı˜ sin 2θ sin 2φ√
km,i,jkm,ı˜,˜
)
+
C2N
2
D
nǫ
ı˜∑
m=1
(
c2ı˜ (2 sin
2(θ − φ) + sin 2θ sin 2φ)
km,ı˜,˜
− cicı˜ sin 2θ sin 2φ√
km,i,jkm,ı˜,˜
)
,
(74)
where
km,i,j := j + (m− 1)nǫi . (75)
Obtaining the final estimate The sum over the angles in (71) is now postponed to first perform the sums
over j and ˜ from (67). For two of the four terms in (74) this summation easily yields a nice result:
nǫi∑
j=1
nǫı˜∑
˜=1
D
nǫ
i∑
m=1
1
km,i,j
=
nǫı˜∑
˜=1
D∑
k=1
1
k
=
nǫı˜
C2N
,
nǫi∑
j=1
nǫı˜∑
˜=1
D
nǫ
ı˜∑
m=1
1
km,ı˜,˜
=
nǫi∑
j=1
D∑
k=1
1
k
=
nǫi
C2N
. (76)
For the other two terms one has the estimate
nǫi∑
j=1
nǫı˜∑
˜=1
D
nǫ
i∑
m=1
1√
km,i,jkm,ı˜,˜
≥
nǫi∑
j=1
nǫı˜∑
˜=1
D
nǫ
i∑
m=1
1√
mnǫimn
ǫ
ı˜
=
√
nǫin
ǫ
ı˜
D
nǫ
i∑
m=1
1
m
=
√
nǫin
ǫ
ı˜

 1
C2N
−
D∑
m= D
nǫ
i
+1
1
m


≥√nǫinǫı˜

 1
C2N
−
∫ D
D
nǫ
i
1
x
dx

 =√nǫinǫı˜
(
1
C2N
− log (nǫi)
) (77)
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and similarly
nǫi∑
j=1
nǫı˜∑
˜=1
D
nǫ
ı˜∑
m=1
1√
km,i,jkm,ı˜,˜
≥√nǫinǫı˜
(
1
C2N
− log (nǫı˜)
)
. (78)
Combining these estimates with the expression (74) and making use of (48) gives
nǫi∑
j=1
nǫı˜∑
˜=1
∫ ∣∣∣pAθ (ai,j |λ)− pBφ(bi,j |λ)
∣∣∣ dµΨǫ
I
(λ)
≤c
2
in
ǫ
ı˜
2
(2 sin2(θ − φ) + sin 2θ sin 2φ)− cicı˜
√
nǫin
ǫ
ı˜
2
(
1− C2N log (nǫi)
)
sin 2θ sin 2φ
+
c2ı˜n
ǫ
i
2
(2 sin2(θ − φ) + sin 2θ sin 2φ)− cicı˜
√
nǫin
ǫ
ı˜
2
(
1− C2N log (nǫı˜)
)
sin 2θ sin 2φ
<
nǫin
ǫ
ı˜(1 + ǫ)
dǫ
(
2 sin2(θ − φ) + sin 2θ sin 2φ)− nǫinǫı˜(1− ǫ)
dǫ
(
1− 12C2N log(nǫinǫı˜)
)
sin 2θ sin 2φ
<2nǫı˜ sin
2(θ − φ) + 2nǫı˜ǫ+ nǫı˜C2N log(dǫ).
(79)
Finally, combining this result with (66), (67) and (71), one obtains
∫ ∣∣p˜A(ai|λ)− c2i ∣∣ dµψI(λ) <ǫ+ 1dǫ
d∑
ı˜=1
(2L+ 1)nǫı˜
(
2 sin2
(
π
2(2L+1)
)
+ 2ǫ+ C2N log(d
ǫ)
)
<
π2
2(2L+ 1)
+ (4L+ 3)ǫ+
(2L+ 1) log(dǫ)
log(1 +N
∏d
i=1 n
ǫ
i)
.
(80)
Now choose L such that π
2
2(2L+1) <
1
3E , then choose ǫ such that (4L+3)ǫ < 13E , and finally choose N such that
(2L+1) log(dǫ)
log(1+N
∏
d
i=1 n
ǫ
i)
< 13E . Plugging these choices into (80) one obtains (47).
C Some remaining calculations
Proof for (73) The equality follows with the use of parameter independence to get an estimate in terms of
quantum probabilities.∫ ∣∣∣pAπ
2
(ai,j |λ) − pB(bı˜,˜|λ)
∣∣∣ dµΨI(λ)
≤
∑
(r,s) 6=(ı˜,˜)
∫
pAπ
2
B(ai,jbr,s|λ)dµΨI(λ) +
∑
(r,s) 6=(i,j)
∫
pAπ
2
B(ar,sbı˜,˜|λ)dµΨI(λ)
=
∑
(r,s) 6=(ı˜,˜)
〈
ΨF
∣∣∣U∗π
2
PAi,jU π2 P
B
r,s
∣∣∣ΨF〉+ ∑
(r,s) 6=(i,j)
〈
ΨF
∣∣∣U∗π
2
PAr,sU π2 P
B
ı˜,˜
∣∣∣ΨF〉
=
∑
(r,s) 6=(ı˜,˜)
〈
ΨF
∣∣PAı˜,˜PBr,s∣∣ΨF〉+ ∑
(r,s) 6=(ı˜,˜)
〈
ΨF
∣∣PAr,sPBı˜,˜∣∣ΨF〉 = 0,
(81)
where the final step follows because of the perfect correlations in ΨF.
Proof for (74) The first step is again to make use of parameter independence to get an estimate in terms of
quantum probabilities.∫ ∣∣∣pAθ (ai,j |λ)− pBφ(bi,j |λ)
∣∣∣ dµΨI(λ)
≤
∑
(r,s) 6=(i,j)
∫
pAθBφ(ai,jbr,s|λ)dµΨI(λ) +
∑
(r,s) 6=(i,j)
∫
pAθBφ(ar,sbi,j |λ)dµΨI(λ)
=
∑
(r,s) 6=(i,j)
〈
UθVφΨF
∣∣PAi,jPBr,s∣∣UθVφΨF〉+ ∑
(r,s) 6=(i,j)
〈
UθVφΨF
∣∣PAr,sPBi,j∣∣UθVφΨF〉 . (82)
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The next step is to find a better expression for the first sum, and then use the similarity between the two sums
to also obtain an expression for the second sum. For this look at the action of the projection operators:
PAi,jUθP
B
r,sVφΨF = CN
D∑
k=1
d∑
ι=1
cι√
k
PAi,jUθP
B
r,sVφ
∣∣∣⌈ knǫι
⌉
,
⌈
k
nǫι
⌉∣∣∣jι,k, jι,k∣∣∣ι, ι〉 . (83)
The action of PAi,jUθ on each component in the sum yields a non-zero result only if (ι, jι,k) = (i, j) or (ι, jι,k) =
(˜ı, ˜). For ι = i, jι,k takes on the value j exactly
D
nǫi
times in the sum over k. On these occasions, k takes on
the values j, j+nǫi , . . . , j +(
D
nǫi
− 1)nǫi . For this reason the expression km,i,j = j+(m− 1)nǫi is introduced. The
case for ι = ı˜ is similar. Thus performing the sum over ι in (83) gives
PAi,jUθP
B
r,sVφΨF = CN
D
nǫ
i∑
m=1
ci cos θ√
km,i,j
PBr,sVφ |m,m|j, j|i, i〉 − CN
D
nǫ
ı˜∑
m=1
cı˜ sin θ√
km,ı˜,˜
PBr,sVφ |m,m|j, ˜|i, ı˜〉 (84)
Because of the action of the projection operator PBr,s, the sum over (r, s) 6= (i, j) only picks up a term when
(r, s) = (˜ı, ˜). So
∑
(r,s) 6=(i,j)
PAi,jUθP
B
r,sVφΨF =CN
D
nǫ
i∑
m=1
ci cos θ√
km,i,j
PBı˜,˜Vφ |m,m|j, j|i, i〉 − CN
D
nǫ
ı˜∑
m=1
cı˜ sin θ√
km,ı˜,˜
PBı˜,˜Vφ |m,m|j, ˜|i, ı˜〉
=CN
D
nǫ
i∑
m=1
ci cos θ sinφ√
km,i,j
|m,m|j, ˜|i, ı˜〉 − CN
D
nǫ
ı˜∑
m=1
cı˜ sin θ cosφ√
km,ı˜,˜
|m,m|j, ˜|i, ı˜〉 .
(85)
Bringing also the other rotations in (82) to the right gives
∑
(r,s) 6=(i,j)
U∗θP
A
i,jUθV
∗
φ P
B
r,sVφΨF =CN
D
nǫ
i∑
m=1
ci cos θ sinφ√
km,i,j
(
cos θV ∗φ |m,m|j, ˜|i, ı˜〉 − sin θV ∗φ |m,m|˜, ˜|˜ı, ı˜〉
)
+ CN
D
nǫ
ı˜∑
m=1
cı˜ sin θ cosφ√
km,ı˜,˜
(
sin θV ∗φ |m,m|˜, ˜|˜ı, ı˜〉 − cos θV ∗φ |m,m|j, ˜|i, ı˜〉
)
.
(86)
And finally∑
(r,s) 6=(i,j)
U∗θP
A
i,jUθV
∗
φ P
B
r,sVφΨF
=CN
D
nǫ
i∑
m=1
ci cos θ sinφ√
km,i,j
(cos θ cosφ |m,m|j, ˜|i, ı˜〉+ cos θ sinφ |m,m|j, j|i, i〉
− sin θ cosφ |m,m|˜, ˜|˜ı, ı˜〉 − sin θ sinφ |m,m|˜, j |˜ı, i〉)
+ CN
D
nǫ
ı˜∑
m=1
cı˜ sin θ cosφ√
km,ı˜,˜
(sin θ cosφ |m,m|˜, ˜|˜ı, ı˜〉+ sin θ sinφ |m,m|˜, j |˜ı, i〉
− cos θ cosφ |m,m|j, ˜|i, ı˜〉 − cos θ sinφ |m,m|j, j|i, i〉)
(87)
Because of the perfect correlations in ΨF, only the four terms with i, i and ı˜, ı˜ in the final expression
contribute to the sum over expectation values in (82). This results in∑
(r,s) 6=(i,j)
〈
UθVφΨF
∣∣PAi,jPBr,s∣∣UθVφΨF〉
=C2N
D
nǫ
i∑
m=1
c2i
km,i,j
cos2 θ sin2 φ− C2N
D
nǫ
i∑
m=1
cicı˜√
km,i,jkm,ı˜,˜
cos θ sin θ cosφ sinφ
+ C2N
D
nǫ
ı˜∑
m=1
c2ı˜
km,ı˜,˜
sin2 θ cos2 φ− C2N
D
nǫ
ı˜∑
m=1
cicı˜√
km,i,jkm,ı˜,˜
cos θ sin θ cosφ sinφ.
(88)
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Making use of the trigonometric expression sin2(θ−φ) = cos2 θ sin2 φ+sin2 θ cos2 φ− 2 cos θ sin θ cosφ sinφ, the
desired result (74) follows.
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